Special Report: China sets new records in air-sea operations around Taiwan

Date Posted: 10-Mar-2025
Author:  Akhil Kadidal, Bangalore

Key points

• China has significantly increased the pace and scale of air incursions into Taiwan's ADIZ
• Deployments suggest the PLA is shifting from a training focus to combat orientation

The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) has significantly scaled up its air operations into Taiwan's Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) since mid-2024, setting a new annual record for the number of air incursions, official data show.

PLA aircraft conducted 3,615 flights into the ADIZ in 2024, according to data from Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense (MND). This is more than double the 1,669 PLA aircraft recorded in the ADIZ in 2023 and is far higher than the 1,597 aircraft recorded in 2022 and the 972 aircraft tracked in 2021. In January and February 2025 the PLA flew another 739 aircraft into the ADIZ, the data show.

This escalation is likely part of a broad effort by the PLA to accelerate operational combat training of multiple units, while improving its force posture. If the PLA's air operations from August 2023 had the intention of mitigating the importance of the median line (the de facto border between China and Taiwan), its operations in 2024–25 are demonstrating the PLA's ability to wield combat-capable mass against the island and its allies.

China's incursions into the ADIZ began to rise from May 2024, according to the MND data. The spike coincided with Taiwan's new President Lai Ching-te taking office on 20 May. Beijing has previously described Lai as a “separatist”.

According to Taiwan MND data, the PLA conducted at least 207 military flights into the ADIZ in May 2024. This includes the 49 aircraft that participated in China's Exercise ‘Joint Sword-2024A' on 23 May, three days after Lai assumed leadership of the island. Senior Captain Li Xi, a spokesperson of the PLA Eastern Theater Command (ETC), said at the time that ‘Joint Sword-2024A' was conducted as a “strong punishment for the separatist acts of ‘Taiwan independence' forces”.

PLA air and sea unit incursions into Taiwan's ADIZ in 2024. (Taiwan Ministry of National Defense/Janes)

PLA air incursions reached a peak of 507 in July 2024. China has since made efforts to conduct an average of more than 360 sorties per month in the ADIZ, according to the data. China is also sustaining such high numbers through a series of ‘joint combat readiness patrols', which began at the start of 2024.

In January 2024 a spokesperson from China's MND said the patrols are intended to “improve the level of actual combat-oriented training” of PLA air and sea units involved.

For Tzu-yun Su, director of the Division of Defense Strategy and Resources at the government-funded Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR) in Taipei, the PLA has come to regard Taiwan as “an excuse and a target for training”. At the same time, China's operations in the ADIZ are also creating “a new normal to replace the status quo as a political preparation for war”, Tzu-yun said.

The escalation in PLA activity also reflects China's improved military capabilities, according to Tzu-yun. “China's record-breaking military flights not only reflect the [improved] training of pilots but also the increased production and reliability of China's domestically developed Shenyang WS10 series of engines,” he said.

The WS10 ‘Taihang' is a two-shaft augmented low-bypass-ratio military turbofan engine. The engine, which has an estimated power ratings between 127 kN and 135 kN, power a variety of Chinese combat aircraft. These include the Chengdu J-10 fourth-generation and J-20 fifth-generation, and the Shenyang J-11 fourth-generation and J-16 multirole 4.5-generation combat aircraft.

Data downgrades

It is no longer possible to identify the specific PLA aircraft and variants now operating in Taiwan's ADIZ. From late January 2024 Taiwan's MND downsized the scope of information it disclosed in its daily ADIZ reports.

However, the Taiwan MND has said that PLA “main combat aircraft” are responsible for the majority of the daily incursions. The MND defines this classification as the PLA's primary fixed-wing combat aircraft such as the J-10, J-11, J-16, Sukhoi Su-30MKK fighter, and Xian H-6 bomber aircraft. MND data has not yet disclosed the presence of Chinese fifth-generation combat aircraft in the ADIZ.

Also operating in the ADIZ are what Taipei now describes as “main auxiliary combat aircraft”, which refers to special mission aircraft such as Shaanxi KJ-500 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C), Shaanxi Y-8/Y-9-based electronic warfare (EW), anti-submarine warfare (ASW), or the Xian YY-20 in-flight refueller.

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and helicopters comprise additional aircraft categories, according to the MND's classification system.

The MND has not commented on why it downsized the scope of data in its ADIZ-related disclosures, but Tzu-yun said it was likely done to mitigate the “propaganda” value of the incursions for China while also hindering Beijing from analysing Taiwan's detection and surveillance capabilities.

Janes assesses that the incursions are likely being used to train PLA pilots and aircrews in strikes, long-endurance combat air patrols, electronic intelligence gathering-EW, and air blockade.

Alongside these training operations, the PLA also occasionally uses UAVs on long-range intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions, to monitor changes to Taiwan's military deployments and reactions to the ADIZ incursions.

China's Shaanxi KJ-500A airborne early warning and control aircraft is a frequent presence in Taiwan's ADIZ. (Janes/Sam Wise)

However, the presence of Y-8Q ASW aircraft in the ADIZ is almost certainly part of routine PLA operations.

China is also honing its ability to operate a large number of aircraft beyond southeastern and eastern Taiwan, likely in anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) operations. According to the ADIZ data, the PLA conducted five encircling operations of the island between 1 January 2024 and 28 February 2025, using aircraft and ISR or combat-capable UAVs.

The PLA also operated off Taiwan's eastern territorial waters on 12 occasions, in addition to 26 specific flights over the Bashi Channel from 1 January 2024 to 28 February 2025. Janes reported in October 2024 on Chinese military drills involving carrier-borne aircraft to isolate the eastern side of Taiwan.

Not all PLA aircraft detected by Taiwan enter the ADIZ. According to the 2024 ADIZ data, aircraft incursions into the ADIZ comprised 61% of the total number of PLA aircraft monitored around Taiwan that year, which was 5,951 aircraft. A percentage of aircraft operating outside the ADIZ are likely involved in long-range A2/AD or interdiction training drills. The Taiwan MND provides no map-based information on PLA aircraft outside the ADIZ.

Beyond aircraft, the PLA is engaging naval vessels on standing patrols around the island. According to Tzu-yun, this “escalation reflects China's primary objective to transition from ‘a land power to a sea power'”.

“What is … noteworthy is the increase in the number of warships, from a nominal deployment in the past to a normal deployment of more than five ships,” he said.

According to the ADIZ data, in the first quarter of 2024, the PLA Navy (PLAN) operated an average of five ships daily in the waters around Taiwan. However, by the third and fourth quarter, the PLAN was maintaining a daily naval presence of at least seven ships in the waters around Taiwan.

This has implications for Taipei, according to Tzu-yun, who said that through the deployment of the naval vessels equipped with vertical launch system (VLS) missile cells, the PLAN has in place “nearly 500 land-attacking cruise missiles [at any given time] that can be used to conduct missile surprise strikes against Taiwan at close range”.

Some PLA Air Force flights into Taiwan's ADIZ are supported by Xian YY-20 Kunpeng aerial tankers. (Janes/Sam Wise)

Some of the increased naval presence is also attributable to efforts by the PLA Ground Force (PLAGF) to exercise cross-sea amphibious attacks in the Taiwan Strait. In August 2024 the state-owned China Central Television (CCTV) said the PLA ETC had practised “a large-scale amphibious operation involving all types and branches of the PLA”.

During the drill, Harbin Z-9, Z-19, and Z-20 helicopters from the PLAGF's 71st Army Aviation Brigade units used civil cargo ships to undergo rearming, refuelling, and short-term maintenance. The drill was likely intended to offset the lack of available landing areas in the Taiwan Strait for short-ranged PLA combat aircraft such as helicopters.

According to CCTV, the drill was part of China's efforts “to defend the right to keep Taiwan under its control at all costs”. This message was reinforced by Chinese President Xi Jinping's 2024 New Year's eve speech, during which he reiterated that “no one can stop the historical trend of national reunification”.