Date Posted: 07-Feb-2025
Author: Heather Nicell, London, United Kingdom
Key points
- Event: A faction of the TPLF, a former militant group and political party led by its chairman Debretsion Gebremichael, has moved an unknown number of troops towards the disputed areas of Wolkayit and Raya in Ethiopia's Tigray region, according to private news outlet Borkena on 2 February
- Significance: The reported movement of troops further heightens existing tensions in the region. Since August 2024 tensions have notably increased within the TPLF, leading to a split within the party that month, highlighting the power struggle between two significant leadership figures in Tigray
- Outlook: Janes assesses that an increased risk of violence between the TPLF's two factions in Tigray region is very likely in the short term, as well as fighting with neighbouring Amharan forces. Increased violence would likely prompt intervention from the federal government of Ethiopia
Event
A faction of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), led by its chairman Debretsion Gebremichael, has moved an unknown number of troops towards the disputed areas of Wolkayit and Raya in Ethiopia's Tigray region, according to private news outlet Borkena on 2 February.
At the time of publication, the TPLF faction had not commented on Borkena's report. Janes assesses Borkena as B2 for reliability (usually reliable) and accuracy (probably true). Moreover, Ethiopia's Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed published a statement via his X (formerly Twitter) account on 3 February, calling for dialogue and urging the TPLF to resolve its differences with the federal government and “other forces” in a “democratic manner”, underscoring persistent tensions. The statement made no reference to the troop movements. Janes assesses that the “other forces” most likely refer to Amharan regional forces, with whom the TPLF has a historical dispute over Wolkayit and Raya.
In a press conference with local media on 5 February, the deputy chair of Debretsion's TPLF faction, Fetlework Gebregziabher, criticised Abiy's statement, comparing it to statements made by the federal government prior to the outbreak of the Tigray War in 2020. She claimed that these statements were an indirect threat of war. Fetlework stated that the region would resist “colonisation and invasion”, but that peace was the first choice. Janes assesses that this is very likely referring to ongoing conflict between the TPLF and Amharan and federal forces.
Getachew Reda (left), current leader of IRAT, listens during the signing ceremony of Ethiopia's permanent Cessation of Hostilities Agreement between the federal government of Ethiopia and the TPLF in Nairobi on 12 November 2022. (AFP via Getty Images
Significance
The reported movement of troops further heightens existing tensions in the region. Since August 2024 tensions have notably increased within the TPLF, leading to a split within the party that month, highlighting the power struggle between two significant leadership figures in Tigray.
Tensions within the TPLF first escalated when Debretsion held the TPLF's 14th Congress on 13 August 2024, despite the TPLF lacking a legal status and refusing requests by the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) to re-register as a new political party. Former deputy chairman of the TPLF and President of the Interim Regional Administration of Tigray (IRAT) Getachew Reda boycotted the congress, leading to Debretsion announcing the removal of 14 officials, including Getachew, from the party on 17 August for their refusal to join.
Risk to TPLF's political party status
Although NEBE did not recognise the congress, it registered the TPLF as a political party “under special circumstances”, according to a statement published on state media Ethiopian News Agency (ENA) on 9 August and provided a six-month deadline to hold another general assembly, which is due by 10 February 2025. The NEBE subsequently suspended the TPLF as a political party for three months as of 13 February, citing its failure to hold the general assembly within the legally mandated period.
NEBE reminded the TPLF that “failure to fulfil this obligation will result in measures being taken in accordance with the law”. However, the TPLF under Debretsion has since announced that it would not comply, according to a statement released via its official Facebook account on 17 January 2025. This underscores the risk to the TPLF's political status and heightens the likelihood of an outbreak of violence between its two factions
TPLF power struggle
The actions of the TPLF under Debretsion highlight the lack of unity within Tigray region and a power struggle between the factions, which has caused factional demonstrations since September 2024. Moreover, both factions have taken several divisive actions to undermine the other. IRAT has attempted to position itself more closely to the federal government and has referred to Debretsion's actions as a “coup”, according to a 7 October 2024 statement released via the Tigray Communication Affairs Bureau's Facebook account. In addition, the privately-owned The Reporter Ethiopia alleged on 1 February that the IRAT had enacted legislation that would allow the Ethiopian federal government to intervene in the region, a move that would very likely indicate that the Getachew faction was attempting to consolidate power in response to violence in Tigray. However, Getachew denied this in a post on his X account on the same day.
In March 2023 the federal government announced the formation of IRAT and appointed Getachew as its president, making him de jure interim leader of Tigray, which almost certainly cements federal support for Getachew should violence between the factions break out. This followed the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA), or 2022 Pretoria Agreement, in November 2022 that ended the Tigray War.
However, prominent military leaders aligned with Debretsion from Tigray called for the dissolution of IRAT in a press conference with local media on 23 January 2025, calling the leadership and members of the interim administration “tools of foreign power” and calling for a reorganisation of Tigray's government. This further highlights the deep-rooted division within the factions, almost certainly indicating that Debretsion enjoys more support among military leaders who fought during the Tigray War, and undermining the legitimacy of Getachew's interim administration.
Military mobilisation and regional instability
NEBE and the federal government are likely to view Debretsion faction's alleged mobilisation of troops towards Wolkayit and Raya as hostile and in violation of the terms set out for the party's registration as a political party in August 2024. Prior to the split in August 2024, Tigrayan forces had engaged in sporadic clashes with ethnic Amharan forces in these areas in mid-2024. Such violence was caused largely due to the regions' dispute over Wolkayit and Raya woredas (districts) in western and southern parts of Tigray region. The TPLF seized control of these areas in 1991 following the overthrow of the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) in Ethiopia, which ruled between 1974 and 1991. Moreover, the Amharan Special Forces – prior to their integration into the police or federal army in April 2023 – was supportive of the Ethiopian federal forces during the Tigray War, thereby fighting against the TPLF. Debretsion's perceived influence among Tigray forces, following the support of prominent military leaders, further heightens the risk of an outbreak of conflict with neighbouring Amhara and the interim administration in the short term.
Outlook
Janes assesses that an increased risk of violence between the TPLF's two factions in Tigray region is very likely in the short term, as well as fighting with neighbouring Amharan forces. Increased violence would likely prompt an intervention from the federal government of Ethiopia.
The impending deadline for the next TPLF congress – 10 February – is likely to further heighten tensions between the group's two factions should either hold a congress independently without the other. Should the TPLF lose its status as a legitimate political party, Getachew's interim administration is almost certain to have the support of the federal government and NEBE in re-registering as a new party, which is very likely to antagonise Debretsion.
If violence breaks out, federal forces are likely to intervene in the medium term (six to 24 months) owing to the interim administration's alignment with the federal government.
At least 75,000 former TPLF militants were awaiting Ethiopia's disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) programme when it was launched in November 2024, two years after the peace agreement, according to a statement by Ethiopia's National Rehabilitation Commission (NRC) that month. However, at the time of publication, there are an unknown number of former TPLF militants who have yet to undergo the DDR process. Moreover, unverified Ethiopian media reports have reported on funding issues since the programme's launch, which is likely to further delay disarmament if true. Janes assesses that instability is very likely to persist in Tigray and neighbouring regions until the full DDR programme has been completed, ensuring the full implementation of the 2022 Pretoria Agreement.
Risk positive indicator
- Peaceful dialogue leading to reunification of the TPLF factions and greater stability within the Tigray region. However, Janes assesses that this is very unlikely to happen in the short term, given the escalating tensions between the factions.
Risk negative indicator
- Failure to fully implement the 2022 Pretoria Agreement and any disruption to the DDR programme will almost certainly lead to protracted instability in Ethiopia.
- Further mobilisation of forces, supportive of either TPLF factions, could indicate an increased likelihood of conflict in Tigray region.
- Clashes between Tigrayan and Amharan forces would likely lead to broader ethnic conflict previously recorded during the Tigray War in 2020.
(Note: Items from news/wire services are abstracted from the originals and are not verbatim)
For more information, please see Tigray troop movements indicate increased risk of inter-factional violence with Ethiopia's Amhara region
