Date Posted: 04-July-2024
Author: Vaibhav Sharma, Bangalore Jack Nicholls, Croydon Nidhi Dalal, Bangalore
Key points
- At the time of publication, the SAC's position in central and southern Myanmar was stable, although the security situation in border states remained volatile
- To regain control of border states, on 31 May the SAC ordered the mobilisation of military and police personnel in eight of the country's worst-affected 14 RMCs
- Further combat is almost certain in the next three months; however, the May–October monsoon season will inhibit the SAC's ability to deploy its key aerial assets to secure political and military control of the country
Introduction
This report assesses developments in the Myanmar conflict between 1 March and 31 May 2024. It is the second iteration of the Myanmar quarterly update, with the first report reviewing the period between 1 December 2023 and 29 February 2024. This report highlights the security implications of the fighting between the State Administration Council (SAC, also referred to in this report as the regime, junta, or government) and non-state armed groups (NSAGs) for control of military and civilian infrastructure in areas including the Sagaing Region, and Rakhine, Kachin, and Kayin states.
The report utilises Janes content alongside data published by local and national media outlets and on social media platforms such as X (formerly Twitter) and Facebook.
Conflict overview
This section reviews combat in Myanmar between 1 March and 31 May 2024 to assess how it has impacted the country's internal security.
In this period, there were several battles for SAC-held urban centres and border posts in western, northern, and eastern border states. As noted in a 7 May Reuters article, this threatened the regime's access to its border crossings with Bangladesh, China, India, and Thailand. By the end of May the regime had limited access in provinces that border these countries – including Shan, Kachin, and Chin states – and was attempting to regain access to crossings in Rakhine State.
Analysis of Janes Events data indicates that the number of militant attacks nationwide remained broadly consistent from March to May 2024. However, there was a notable increase over the previous three months. Janes recorded 579 attack events across the country in this period, compared with the 448 attack events between 1 December 2023 and 29 February 2024. One likely driver behind this increase was the weather, with March–May marking Myanmar's summer season, during which militants have typically been more operationally active.
As of 31 May the regime remained predominantly in control of central and southern territories. However, SAC forces sustained notable operational setbacks in border areas. Combat was typically characterised by infantry-dominated battles for significant local infrastructure, including military installations, urban centres, and transport networks. Other features of the fighting included:
- The SAC's reliance on aircraft (using guided and unguided munitions) and artillery for offensive and defensive purposes to mitigate the absence of territorial control in border areas
- The SAC's and NSAGs' deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in combat and reconnaissance roles
- Limited sophistication of most SAC and NSAG operations, which typically consisted of infantry attacks using Cold War-era weapons
Strategic summary
Janes assesses that despite sustaining tactical defeats in border states, the government remained in a stable position in central and southern territories during the period under review. This very likely provided the SAC with sufficient strategic depth – the distance between its core political, economic, and military assets and the front lines – to retain control of key urban centres and retaliate against militant attacks.
Strategic depth in Myanmar: key locations and infrastructure. Janes assesses that the SAC's survival almost certainly relies on its control of military installations, transport links, and urban centres, many of which are located in central and southern territories. (Esri/Janes)
Since October 2023 the SAC has lost access to vital trade routes because of fighting in border provinces. Meanwhile the control of central and southern areas, including the key economic ‘Dry Zone' in upper-central Myanmar, is crucial for the government's survival as it includes important military installations, transport links, and urban centres.
Analysis of Janes data shows that most of the government's military equipment is located in central and southern military installations. These installations are largely located within urban centres that are connected by paved highways. Much of the terrain in central and southern areas is flat, which is easier for armoured units to manoeuvre through than the hilly and densely wooded border territories. The SAC's control of this territory has enabled it to deploy land-based and aerial platforms to counter militant activity across the country. This follows a pattern that emerged during the latter stages of the ‘Operation 1027' offensive in January 2024, with the regime using artillery and aircraft to disrupt opposition attacks on SAC-held outposts and urban centres in border provinces
For example, the SAC still controls the port city of Yangon, in the Yangon Region, where, according to a Janes analysis from 14 March 2024 , a new type of coastal submarine that will likely enhance the junta's special forces operations was identified. The submarine will enable the SAC to use Myanmar's territorial waters to supply forces in isolated positions, such as in northern Rakhine State. Additional support from the Myanmar Navy (Tatmadaw Yei) is available through assets such as the newly upgraded Kyan Sit Thar-class guided-missile frigate.
The SAC has very likely used militias to maintain security in central areas and support military operations against NSAGs across the country. According to an 18 January Radio Free Asia article, earlier that month SAC troops offered financial and food incentives to encourage potential recruits in the southwestern Bago Region. However, the success of these efforts is contingent on the extent of local support for opposition groups, which very likely varies in each township.
These militias would enable the SAC to retaliate against militants operating in central and southern areas, which almost certainly inhibit the regime's ability to protect its military equipment. For example, according to a Janes analysis from 8 April 2024 , on 4 April militants associated with the anti-junta National Unity Government (NUG) attacked Myanmar's administrative capital Naypyidaw. The assault involved UAVs, marking the first attack of this kind on the city. One target of the attack was Alar Air Base, which is located next to Naypyidaw International Airport and hosts several high-value air assets of the Myanmar Air Force (Tatmadaw Lay). These include newly acquired Sukhoi Su-30SME multirole combat aircraft, alongside transport aircraft. No casualties were reported at the time of publication, and it is unclear how many UAVs successfully detonated. There were also no reports of significant damage to the regime's aircraft. However, the use of UAVs by NUG-affiliated forces is an emerging and significant threat to the SAC's military capabilities and therefore its ability to suppress militant attacks.
