This webinar focuses on Horn of Africa states' co-operation with China in three thematic areas: political and security, economic, and military and defence co-operation.
Transcript
Janes analysts have analysed Horn of Africa states’ co-operation with China in three thematic areas: political and security, economic, and military and defence co-operation.
Ethiopia and China maintain close bilateral ties, with Ethiopia representing China’s long-term strategic partner in the Horn of Africa/Sub-Saharan Africa region. China has previously described itself as Ethiopia’s “good brother, friend, and partner”, highlighting the importance it places on its relationship with Ethiopia.
China and Ethiopia have engaged diplomatically through high-level bilateral visits, and various initiatives such as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, China-Africa Peace and Security Forum, and China’s Outlook on Peace and Development in the Horn of Africa. During Ethiopia’s two-year long Tigray conflict, China provided donations of food, vaccines, and other humanitarian supplies; however, China did not intervene, despite significant geoeconomic interests in the country and wider region, which we will discuss later.
China has, however, tested its diplomatic skills in Ethiopia, while respecting its own policy of non-interference and respect for sovereignty, which has been part of its foreign policy since 1954. Indeed, more recently, China’s policy of non-interference was underpinned by its Global Security Initiative (GSI), launched in April 2022, which promotes distinct security concepts and principles, some of the most significant of which are its policies on territorial sovereignty and non-interference. Thus, China’s political and security efforts in Ethiopia have remained cemented in soft power.
Although the Tigray conflict ended with the signing of a peace agreement between Ethiopian federal government and leaders from the country’s Tigray region in November 2022, the peace agreement has yet to be fully implemented. Since the first outbreak of the Tigray war in November 2022, China had made several statements expressing its confidence in Ethiopia on settling the conflict without external forces or influence.
Indeed, special envoy for the Horn of Africa Xue met with regional leaders and the Ethiopian federal government in December 2023 to ensure the full implementation of the peace agreement. This very likely highlights the constructive role China has within Ethiopia in supporting the country’s political stability and security.
The special envoy had previously stated in March 2023 that “China always believes that the Tigray conflict is the domestic affairs of Ethiopia and should be resolved by the Ethiopian people themselves through negotiation and dialogue”. He further emphasised that “China opposes interference in other countries’ sovereignty and domestic affairs in the name of humanitarianism and human rights”
Moving on to China’s economic co-operation with the Horn of Africa countries, let’s look at Djibouti’s case.
In the medium to long term, China is almost certain to play a key role in Djibouti’s ambition to reach net-zero as part of its national Vision 2035 strategy. In October 2023 the Chairman of Djibouti Ports and Free Zone Authority Omar Hadi met with the Vice-President of China-based State Power Investment Corporation (SPIC) in Beijing.
According to the corporation’s website, it is “ranking first globally in solar energy, second in wind energy, and among the top 10 in hydroelectric power generation”. In a news article covering the meeting on the authority’s website, the Chinese company “presented a range of technological solutions for realising zero-emission power generation within the Djibouti Free Zones. They also expressed their eagerness to assist in capacity building for the careers in the net-zero system”. Therefore, we are very likely to see greater co-operation between Chinese green energy companies and Djibouti’s energy infrastructure in the years to come.
Just one month later, in November 2023 Hadi also met with the Economic and Commercial Councillor of the Chinese Embassy in Djibouti, Liang Hao. According to the authority’s website, the meeting primarily focused on Djibouti’s green transition including sustainable energy, exploring wind, geothermal, and solar energy with potential collaboration on projects. Finally, in May 2024 Hadi signed a trilateral strategic co-operation framework agreement between the Djibouti Ports and Free Zones Authority, the Ministry of Higher Education and Research of Djibouti, and China-based Dongchi New Energy Technology. The framework provides solutions for the new energy industry and industrial upgrading schemes for new forms of energy production.
Furthermore, the agreement includes the implementation of new training schemes for those working in the green energy industry including collaborations between Dongchi and the University of Djibouti. Djibouti has also recently approved the establishment of a branch of China’s state-owned oil company SINOPEC.
China is Eritrea’s main trade partner, as the country has been subject to financial sanctions and restrictions linked to the ruling party’s failure to implement the peace agreement with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front and the Eritrean armed forces’ track record of human rights abuses. These sanctions and restrictions have affected Eritrea’s business environment and its attractiveness for foreign investments.
In 2021 Eritrea signed an MOU with China to join the latter’s BRI. This is perceived as an opportunity to promote the industrialisation and the diversification of Eritrea’s economy. In multiple interviews and statements to Chinese and Eritrean media, Afwerki has highlighted that his government rejects what he qualified as a “Western media narrative” around China’s ‘debt trap’ diplomacy in Africa. He has gone as far as claiming that countries negatively affected by indebtment to China owe that to their own poor financial management. In his interview to CGTN in May 2023, Afwerki stated that the ‘debt trap’ narrative was “an attempt to defame China-Africa relations”.
Although Eritrea’s development priorities are largely focused on the agriculture and infrastructure sectors, China’s most significant investments in the country have been directed to the exploration of Eritrea’s mineral resources. Eritrea holds the largest known sulphate of potash (SOP) deposits in the world, which is a premium grade fertiliser, and China has been looking to secure supplies of the commodity
From an economic standpoint, China has significant strategic interest in Ethiopia, largely owing to its geographic location, with Ethiopia serving as a central focus point for China’s BRI. Ethiopia not only neighbours Djibouti, where China’s first overseas military base opened in August 2017, but the country also serves as the headquarters of the African Union (AU) – a union, which aims to provide a strategic framework for delivering on Africa's goal for inclusive and sustainable development.
As such, China has made significant contributions to ensure Ethiopia’s development, capacity building, and employment. Not only is China the greatest source of imports to Ethiopia, but China is also the greatest lender in Ethiopia, accounting for almost 50% of all foreign direct investment (FDI), which includes critical national infrastructure projects. Ethiopia’s Ministry of Economy stated that China’s contributions to critical national infrastructure (CNI) development, capacity building, and employment, were of “paramount value”, according to a statement released on the ministry’s website in December 2023.
Such notable Chinese-funded projects, within the framework of China’s BRI, have included the Ethiopia to Djibouti Railway, a 752.7 km standard gauge railway line, which established a crucial link between landlocked Ethiopia and Red Sea ports in neighbouring Djibouti in 2016. Marking the first electrified cross-border railway in Africa, it has naturally enhanced regional economic and social integration between Ethiopia and Djibouti and facilitated the transport of military equipment to Ethiopia. Djibouti is also the location of Ethiopia’s first naval facility following the re-establishment of its navy in 2020.
Alongside the investment in CNI and a strong trade partnership, Ethiopia has sought China’s financial support in developing its energy and commercial satellite industries, with China making investments into the mining, renewable energy, and construction sectors in the country.
One of the most notable ways in which China is supporting Ethiopia’s development of its energy sector includes the partial financing of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), a project which is worth USD4.2billion and expected to supply power to 70% of Ethiopia’s population, which stands at 126,527,000 according to 2023 data from the United Nations Population Division (UNPD).
China has played a significant role in paving way for the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), through the funding of related infrastructure, such as granting loans to build power transmission lines between the dam and local towns and cities in 2013, loans to expand Ethiopia’s renewable energy sector in 2019, as well as hiring Chinese-owned construction firms. However, the project has seen notable tensions arise between Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia in particular, due to the significant levels of control it would give Ethiopia over the Nile’s water resources, however, China’s principle of non-interference has remained steadfast.
Indeed, in July 2021 Zhang Jun, permanent representative of China to the UN, called for the resumption of negotiations between Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan, emphasising that “China sincerely hopes that the three countries, in the spirit of friendly co-operation, will resume dialogue and consultation as soon as possible”.
To conclude with, China’s presence in the Horn of Africa remains focused on political and economic bilateral co-operation, despite recent initiatives such as the 2023 China-Africa Peace and Security Forum. Despite statements on China’s intent to increase its role as a peace and security actor in the Horn of Africa, Janes assesses that this has not materialised as of 2024.
Djibouti, Eritrea, and Ethiopia continue to perceive bilateral relations with China as mutually beneficial. Building on existing political and economic co-operation, the government of Djibouti views China as a key partner in achieving its energy transition to a net zero by 2035.
For isolated Eritrea, China is expected to remain its most important international partner, while the Chinese investments in the Eritrean mining sector generate important revenue for the Eritrean government. In addition, China is almost certain to remain the actor with the greatest influence in Ethiopia’s economic development in the long term.
